

STRATEGIC ARMS



REDUCTION TALKS

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FRAMEWORK FOR A U.S. NEGOTIATING APPROACH

State Dept. review completed

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REDUCTION TALKS

PURPOSE

BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON THE FRAMEWORK OF AN OPENING START POSITION.

CENTRAL QUESTION

WHAT ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES DO WE WANT TO REDUCE?

COROLLARY

TO WHAT LEVELS DO WE WANT TO REDUCE?

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STRATEGIC ARMS



REDUCTION TALKS

BASIC OBJECTIVES OF A U.S. POSITION

- **MILITARY SUFFICIENCY**
- **STRATEGIC STABILITY**
- **SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS**
- **POLITICALLY PLAUSIBLE**
- **VERIFIABLE**

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REDUCTION TALKS

WHAT SHOULD BE REDUCED?

UNIT OF ACCOUNT

- BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS
- LAUNCHERS
- MISSILE THROW-WEIGHT
- WARHEAD WEIGHT
- BOMBERS
- BOMBER ARMAMENT

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REDUCTION TALKS

CRITERIA FOR UNIT OF ACCOUNT SELECTION

- EASILY UNDERSTOOD
 - WIDE SUPPORT
- DEALS WITH IMPORTANT ASYMMETRIES
- TOUGH BUT PLAUSIBLE
- PROTECT ALLIED INTERESTS
- GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH INF
- VERIFIABLE
- FLEXIBLE AND DURABLE FRAMEWORK
FOR NEGOTIATIONS

STRATEGIC ARMS




REDUCTION TALKS

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THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 1982



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REDUCTION TALKS

AGENCY APPROACHES

	WARHEADS	LAUNCHERS	THROW-WEIGHT	BOMBERS
STATE	YES (5,000)	YES (1,500)	1) HEAVY-MISSILE REDUCTION 2) ICBM WARHEAD REDUCTION	YES (250)
ACDA	YES (4,000)	NO	WARHEAD WEIGHT LIMIT	YES (250)
OSD	YES (4,000)	NO	REDUCTIONS TO U.S. LEVEL	POSSIBLE (250)

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ANALYSIS

UNIT OF ACCOUNT

CRITERIA

- WARHEADS
- LAUNCHERS
- THROW-WEIGHT
- WARHEAD WEIGHT
- BOMBERS
- BOMBER ARMAMENT

- EASILY UNDERSTOOD
 - WIDE SUPPORT
- DEALS WITH IMPORTANT ASYMMETRIES
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STRATEGIC ARMS



REDUCTION TALKS


FOCUS FOR DISCUSSIONS

- How does our choice of units of account help us to achieve significant reductions and also protect our military requirements?
- How does our choice of units of account build or undercut support for the President's strategic modernization program and for the defense program as a whole?
- What is the political environment surrounding START? How does the choice of units of account build or undercut support for the U.S. position:
 - with the public?
 - in Congress?
 - with our Allies?
- Is continuity with SALT I and SALT II good or bad?
- How does verification bear on the choice of the U.S. negotiating proposal?
- Are some proposals more resilient than others? What is the relationship between our negotiating position and the likely course of the negotiations?
- Do we require equality in every important measure of strategic capability? What are the requirements of Public Law 92-448?

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
US WEAPONS
FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAMS



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
USSR WEAPONS
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
(FORCE 1)



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TOTAL US WEAPONS
MISSILES AND BOMBERS
IF AGENCY START PROPOSALS FULLY
IMPLEMENTED BY 1991



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